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ABSTRACT 
Inflation has fallen dramatically in countries like Spain and Italy 
over the last decade, but the rate of increase in "home good" prices 
remains stubbornly higher than the rate of increase in "traded good" 
prices. The paper begins by showing that this discrepancy can be 
explained (at least in part) by trends in productivity j average labour 
productivity has grown much more slowly in the home good sector in these 
countries. The paper goes on to investigate the implications of 
productivity trends for the consistency of the Maastricht convergence 
criteria an for the differences in nation inflation rates after EMU. The 
paper also discusses the difficulties some countries may have in meeting 
the convergence criteria, and some of the options open to them. 

I. IRlkODOCI (If 
Inflation has fallen dramatically in most southern European countries over 
the last decade, but inflation in the home good sector remains stubbornly 
higher than inflation in the traded good sector. Figure lA illustrates the 
point. Real exchange rates -- the price ot home goods in terms of traded goods 
have increased three times faster in Spain and Italy than in Germany.l Or 
in terms of inflation rates, the difference between home good inflation and 
traded good inflation has been almost 3' in Italy and Spain, but less than l' 
in Germany. What is less widely recognized is that this is not just a southern 
European phenomenon. Figure 1B plots the real exchange rates of some of the 
countries that might be expected to be at the core of an eventual monetary 
union. The difference between home good inflation and traded good inflation 
in Belgium has been more than 3., higher than in Italy or Spain. Table 1 gives 
the average inflation differential, and its standard deviation, for various 
European countries. 
What are the forces that are driving these appreciations? What are their 
implications for the Maastricht Treaty process, and what are their implications 
for monetary policy should a monetary union actually come about? Three 
potential explanations of the real appreciations have been put forward. The 
first, and oldest, is the "productivity hypothesis," which attributes the real 
appreciations to more rapid productivity growth in the traded good sector.2 
According to this supply side explanation, traded goods have become cheaper to 
produce, and more so in the countries that have experienced greater real 
appreciations. 
The second, and more recent, potential explanation of the real 
appreciations extends the productivity hypothesis by considering changes in 
demand for traded and home goods. 3 According to this "relative demand 
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hypothesis," stronger demand for home goods, possibly related to growing public 
sector demand, has led to real appreciations that exceed what productivity 
trends alone would imply. 
The' third potential explanation of the real appreciations is a political 
economy argument that has not been formalized in the academic literature but 
is a focal point of policy oriented discussions in Europe. We will call it the 
"labor absorption hypothesis". According to this hypothesis, the common market 
forced the traded good sector in each country to become more competitive; 
surplus labor shed by the traded good sector was absorbed by government 
employment and by a service sector that was protected from competition by 
legislation, distribution networks and tradition. Thus, according to this 
view, the appreciations were caused by excessive public sector employment and 
by rents accruing to the protected home good sector. 
The present paper focuses primarily on a testable implication of the 
productivity hypothesis, an implication that should hold regardless of any 
shifts in relative demands. As we elaborate below, for a class of technologies 
including Cobb-Douglas production functions, marginal cost pricing implies that 
the real exchange rate should be proportional to the ratio of average labor 
productivity in the traded and home good sectors. Figures lC and D plot the 
relative productivity series. To anticipate our results, we find that the 
observed real appreciations are roughly in line with these relative 
productivity trends. This suggests that a standard neoclassical theory of 
marginal cost pricing may explain the appreciations; thUS, the political 
economy arguments of the labor absorption hypothesis may be unnecessary. 
At a more fundamental level, however, the labor absorption hypothesis may 
be interpreted as stating that the observed trends in labor productivity are 
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themselves consequences of excessive growth in public sector employment and/or 
inefficient protection of the home good sector. Our empirical analysis, based 
on macroeconomic aggregates, cannot determine the fundamental, microeconomic 
causes of the observed trends in labor productivity. We can not determine 
whether the relationship between the real exchange rate and relative labor 
productivity should be interpreted along the lines of the neoclassical 
productivity hypothesis or along the lines of the newer labor absorption 
hypothesis. This is unfortunate because, as we elaborate below, the policy 
implications of our findings depend on the underlying causes of the observed 
trends in productivity. 
The first issue we examine is the consistency of the convergence criteria 
in the Maastricht Treaty. The productivity hypothesis implies that convergence 
in CPI inflation may not be consistent with fixed exchange rates. If for 
example monetary policy holds nominal exchange rates fixed, then traded good 
inflation can be expected to equalize across countries.4 But if (as suggested 
by Figure lC) productivity trends require more real appreciation in say Spain 
than in Germany, then home good inflation will have to be higher in Spain, and 
overall CPI inflation will have to be higher as well. So, fixed exchange rates 
are inconsistent with full convergence in CPI inflation, unless changes in 
government policy, at the microeconomic level, can speed up productivity growth 
in the home good sector. 
More fundamentally, we will see that a standard neoclassical model 
predicts real interest rate differentials where real rates are defined in 
terms of CPI inflation -- across countries with different productivity trends. 
The real interest rate differential is determined by productivity, but monetary 
policy determines how the differential manifests itself. It can take the form 
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of a CPI inflation differential, or it can come out as a nominal interest rate 
differential (with an accompanying change in the nominal exchange rate) 
However, full convergence in CPI inflation and nominal interest rates would 
require microeconomic policies leading to convergence of relative labor 
productivities. In the absence of such policies, full convergence in inflation 
and interest rates is simply not on; it is not an equilibrium solution. 
The Maastricht convergence criteria are however more flexible than that; 
they do not require full convergence in CPI inflation, and the ERM allows 
exchange rates to vary within 15t bands. To qualify for participation in the 
mon�tary union, a country must have an inflation rate that is within 1.5% of 
the three best performing member countries and an ERM parity that it has not 
devalued within the last two years. So, the operational question is one of 
time and magnitude. Do observed differences in productivity imply inflation 
differentials that are within 1.5t of each other when limited exchange rate 
flexibility is allowed? Tight monetary policy can keep inflation differentials 
down in the short run, but generally at a cost in terms of employment; the lo�g 
term dictates of productivity may not preclude any country from qualifying if 
the decision period is not too long. However, it should be recognized that 
countries whose producti vi ty trends are working against them are at a real 
disadvantage. If they can not institute reforms that lead to an increase in 
productivity in the service sector, they may have to keep their monetary 
policies artificially tight, just to prove themselves. 
If the convergence criteria are found to be overly burdensome, then one 
must ask whether a country like Spain or Italy should be held to them. Here 
is where the underlying causes of the observed trends in labor productivity 
would seem to be important. If the productivity trends reflect technological 
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factors that cannot be affected by government policy, then one can argue thac 
the observed inflation differentials are due to factors that are independent 
of monetary policy and are in any case not indicative of any sort of 
"competitiveness" problem. If on 'the other hand one ascribes to the labor 
absorption hypothesis, the conclusion might be quite different. One might 
expect countries with rapid real appreciations to put pressure on a common 
central bank for a loose monetary policy, either to ease the financing of 
public deficits or to try to increase employment. One could argue that reforms 
are needed both in the public sector and in the service sector, and that the 
convergence criteria are an appropriate measure of the effectiveness of these 
reforms. 
The second issue we examine is whether countries with very different 
trends in productivity belong in the same monetary union. We can approach this 
issue by asking what monetary policy a European central bank should institute. 
111ere have been a number of official pronouncements on this: 5 the basic 
message is that any new European currency must be "as good and as stable as the 
D-mark". But, this simple notion is not precise enough. A standard 
neoclassical model implies real interest rate differentials where real 
interest rates are defined in terms of regional CPI inflation -- across regions 
that have different productivity trends. With a common nominal interest rate, 
these real interest rate differentials would have to cane out as regional 
inflation differentials. Germany wo�ld be expected to have a lower regional 
inflation rate than say Italy, or the union as a whole. So, what should the 
European cent.ral bank take as its inflation target? If it adopts the old 
German target, then Germany will end up with a lower regional inflation rate 
than before EMU. Is this what Germany wants - - a change i n  its regional 
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inflation policy? On the other hand, the notion that the new European currency 
should be "as good as the D-mark" could be taken to mean that regional 
inflation in Germany should remain unchanged. But then, the union wide 
inflation target would have to be higher than the old German target. will the 
Germans permit this? 
This discussion raises conceptual questions that are not well understood. 
Keynesian models are largely silent on what the long-run inflation target 
should be. More micro based theories tend to focus on the level of interest 
rates, and not inflation rates. For example, shoe leather costs and seignorage 
tax distortions are measured by the level of the nominal interest rate. By 
extension, we might argue that "as good as the D-mark" means that the average 
level of nominal interest rates in Germany should be maintained. OUr model 
implies that this policy would leave trend inflation in Germany unchanged, but 
Germans would have to accept a higher inflation rate for the union as a whole. 
Given recent experience with the German monetary union, some might counter that 
this would lead to regional distortions in wage setting, a factor that is not 
accounted for in more neoclassical models. 
We do not try to settle these difficult conceptual questions here; we 
simply try to get an idea of their quantitative importance. We calculate the 
regional inflation differentials that are implied if current productivity 
trends in Burope persist, and then we make comparisons with regional 
productivity differentials observed in the us. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present 
the neoclassical framework that predicts the relationship, mentioned above, 
between trends in average labor productivity and trends in real exchange rates, 
and we discuss the ways in which this neoclassical framework is, and is not, 
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consistent with the data for eleven European countries. In section III, we 
assess the consistency of the Maastricht convergence criteria, and we calculate 
the regional differentials in inflation that would be implied (in a system of 
fixed exchange rates or EMU) by observed differences in productivity trends. 
We also make comparisons with the us. In section IV, we summarize our results 
and draw conclusions. The data are discussed in more detail in an appendix. 
II. A H)DBL OF PRODUCTIVITY AND IRFLATIOB 
First, we define the productivity hypothesis and derive its implications 
for inflation. Then, we confront the hypothesis with data on eleven European 
countries. And finally, we try (in a very limited way) to explore the labor 
absorption hypothesis. 
The Analytical Fr��ework: 
The analytical framework we use in this paper is quite general; it could 
be embedded in a wide class of models. We do however abstract from short run 
adjustment problems in order to focus on the long run implications of trends 
in productivity. In each country, capital and labor are fully employed in the 
production of traded goods, X,and home goods, N: 
Competition implies that labor is paid the value of its marginal product, and 
labor mobility implies that nominal wage rates, W, equalize across· sectors; so: 
!!aX 
W/P" 
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Figure 2 illustrates this equilibrium condition in a familiar diagram. The 
real exchange rate, pn/pX, is tangent to the production possibility curve, TT' ; 
it is also tangent the home consumer's indifference curve, II' . 
There are two basic approaches to measuring the marginal products in 
equation (2); Froot and Rogoff (1994) provide a recent survey of the existing 
literature. Many studies estimate Cobb-Douglas production functions for each 
sector and relate the marginal product of labor to estimates of factor shares 
and exogenous productivity shocks (total factor productivity). Other studies 
work with data on the average product of labor; Marston (1987) is a well known 
example. We will follow the latter approach for two reasons. First, we do not 
have to use sectoral data on capital stocks; these data are not thought to be 
as reliable as the data we need to calculate the average product of labor. 
Second, as we explain below, our analysis is valid for a broader class of 
production functions than the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
TO switch from marginal to average products, we do have to place a 
restriction on technology. We assume that the marginal product of labor is 
proportional to the average product of labor in each sector : 
Y IX/LX) 
� (N/Ln) 
With this restriction, the real exchange rate, q, is proportional to the ratio 
of the average products of labor, x/n, in the two sector s :  
This proportionality between the real exchange rate and the ratio o f  average 
labor products is our version of the " productivity hypothesis-; it will be the 
basis for all of our empirical work. 
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A wide class of production functions satisfy the constraint (3 ) .  The 
Cobb-Douglas technology is one example: 
(5) X :IE  x (Kx) (l-y) (Lx)y 
N (,I (Kn) (l-b) (Ln)6 
It should be emphasized that under this interpretation, the ratio of ave,rage 
labor producti vities, x/n, is not an exogenous variable. It and the real 
exchange rate, q, are determined by the shocks to total factor productivity, 
X and (,I, and by factors driving demand. In Figure 2, the evolution of X and 
(,I explains how TT' shifts out over time, while taste parameters and government 
policy explain the position of II'. 
This endogeneity of the average labor products may at first appear to be 
a drawback to the approach we have chosen to measure the ratio of marginal 
costs in (2). x/n (unlike the ratio of the total factor productivity shocks, 
X and (01) cannot be presumed to be econometrically exogenous with respect to the 
real exchange rate, q. It turns out however that this will not be a problem 
for our tests of the productivity hypothesis. 6 Moreover, since some economists 
have argued that demand factors (in addition to supply factors) are needed to 
explain real exchange rate movements, our formulation of the producti vi ty 
hypothesis may actually be an advantage. In particular, with Cobb-Douglas 
technologies, (4) holds regardless of demand factors and even if capital is not 
mobile across the two sectors.' MOre generally, it is straightforward to show 
that (4) holds for CBS production functions if both labor and capital are 
mobile across sectors. 
The endogeneity of xln does, however, complicate the interpretation of our 
inflation forecasts in the next section. Our implicit assumption will have to 
be that the combination of supply and demand factors that drive average labor 
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products will continue to drive the ratio x/n along the trend that has been 
observed over the past two decades. 
The final assumptions we need to derive the inflation differentials across 
countries are the law of one price for the traded good; 
(6) pX = epx* 
and a way of calculating "CPI" price levels: 
(7) P = k(px) (1-'I'j) (pn) '1 
pX* is the foreign currency price of the traded good in some other country, e 
is the nominal exchange rate, and 'l is the share of home goods in home 
consumption. CPI inflation, �, can then be defined as: 
(S) "If .  AP/P - Il-'l) Aln(pX) + 'lAln(pn) = Aln(Px) + 'lAln(q) 
We now think of the home country as a country like Italy, and we let the 
foreign (or starred) country be Germany. We can calculate Italy'S inflation 
differential with Germany from equations (4), (6) and (8): 
(9) • � - � Aln(e) + 'lAln{q) 
:::t Aln(e) + 'lAln(x/n) - 'l*Aln(x* In*) 
We will use this equation in the next section to examine the consistency of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. 
To get a better understanding of (9), we consider the change in relative 
CPt indices: 
(10) 1r - ("If* + Aln(e» _ 'l[Aln(q) - Aln(q*U _ 'l(Aln(x/n) - Aln(x*/n*)] 
(where for simplicity 'l* has been set equal to �). Assuming interest parity, 
i = i- + Aln(e), this change in relative CPI indices can be interpreted as the 
real interest rate differential across countries; that is:8 
(11) (i* - .,.. ) - (i - 1r) = .,.. - (i,.. + Aln(e» 
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Equations (10) and (11) say that the real interest rate differential depends 
on relative productivity trends. If x/n is growing faster than x*/n*, then the 
real interest rate in Italy has to be lower than the real interest rate in 
Germany. This fact is easily understood in the special case where traded good 
productivity is growing at the same rate in the two countries, or 
111n (x) ::AIn (x*). Then, if x/n is growing faster than x· /n*, it must also be the 
case that home good productivity is growing slower in Italy than in Germany. 
Italy is less productive, and therefore less wealthy, than Germany. 
Expenditure on the composite good must grow less quickly in Italy, and the 
Italian real interest rate must be lower to make Italian savers content with 
this outcome. The result is stronger than this simple intuition suggests; that 
is, there is no need (and probably good reason not) to assume that 
Aln(x)::Aln(x·) .9 
In any case, real interest rate differentials are determined by trends in 
labor productivity. Monetary policy determines how these real interest rate 
differentials are split between inflation differentials and changes in nominal 
exchange rates. Equation (9) -implies that: 
(12) 11' - 11'* = "l1ln(q) - ,,*Aln(q*) ::: "Aln(x/n) - fl*Aln(x*/n*) 
when the nominal exchange rate is fixed, and that: 
(13) - 111n(e) :;: 'lAln(q) - ll*Aln(q*) ::: llAln(x/n) - 1l*111n{x*/n*) 
when inflation rates converge. The real interest rate differential must come 
out in one place or the other. Under a common currency, it has to come out as 
a regional inflation differential, since there is no nom.inal exchange rate to 
change. 
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The Data: 
We use annual data from 1970 to 1990 on eleven European countries 4 .  
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, 
portugal, Spain, and Sweden.10 We wanted to include all of the countries in 
the EU, but data on Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Greece are incomplete. The 
data come from the DECO National Income Accounts and other sources. A more 
detailed description of the data can be found in an appendix. Basically, home 
good production, N, is measured by value added in services, and can be split 
between market services and non4market services; traded good production, x, is 
measured by value added in manufacturing and agriculture.11 Their prices, pn 
and pX, are the corresponding value added price deflators. Average labor 
productivities, n and x, are measured by value added per employee in the 
sector. 
Testing the Productivity Hypothesis: 
Figures 3A through K plot the real exchange rate, q, and the ratio of 
average labor productivities, x/n, for each country; the variables are in logs 
and have (with the exception of portugal) been normalized to zero in 1970. The 
productivity hypothesis implies that the real exchange rate should follow the 
trend in productivity, and this tendency is clearly illustrated. In the 
German, Austrian, and Finish cases, the relationship seems quite close. In 
some of the other cases however, the relationship seems looser and the trend 
in productivity seems to over predict the exchange rate's appreciation. The 
Danish case appears to be the worst example of this. 
Formal testing of the model is complicated by the small number of 
observations and the potential nonstationarity of the data. In some cases, we 
had more data than what appears in the figures; the tests reported below use 
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all the observations available for each country .12,13 Table 3 reports for 
each country the simple correlation between the growth rate of the real 
exchange rate, Aln(q), and the growth rate of the productivity ratio, Aln(x/n). 
These correlations are generally quite weak, and in some cases negative. This 
confirms our suspicion that the productivity hypothesis can not explain year 
to year fluctuations in the real exchange rate. It may however account for the 
long run trend in the real exchange rate, and that is more pertinent �han the 
short run gyrations for our purposes. 
To evaluate the model's ability to explain long run trends, we first 
consider the hypothesis that the growth rates of the real exchange rate and the 
productivity ratio have the same population mean. The Classical test for the 
equality of population means presumes that the random samples are independent 
across the two populations; it is therefore inappropriate in the present 
context. To circumvent this problem, we test the hypothesis that the time 
series of the difference in growth rates Alnlq) Aln(x/n) has a 
population mean of zero. As usual, this hypothesis implies that the t-ratio 
for the sample mean is asymptotically Standard Normal. The results are 
reported in Table 4: in every case, the sample mean is quantitatively small and 
not significantly different from zero. 
The results of Table 4 suggest that long run trends in the two variables 
may indeed be related. To pursue this point further, we need to take a stand 
on the type of nonstationarity that accounts for the apparent growth in these 
variables over our sample period. Table 5 reports Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests for these variables. The estimated (OLS) regressions are of the form: 
(14) AYt ; a + t�=l 'iAYt_i + pY + error, t-1 
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where Yt is either In(qt) or In (xt/nt) . The T-statistic, reported in Table 5, 
is the ratio of the point estimate of p to its standard error. In conducting 
the tests, we use a general-to-specific procedure to choose the lag length 
k.14 
The T statistics in Table 5 fail to reject the presence of unit roots �n 
our time series, except for the Danish real exchange rate series.is Sim�lar 
tests including a linear time trend (not reported) also fail to reject the 
presence of unit roots in the majority of cases. As is well known, unit root 
tests can suffer from low power in small samples. A.l though the annual 
frequency of our observations mitigates this problem to some extent, our 
results should be interpreted with caution.16 We think, however, that 
Figures 3A to J strongly suggest that these data series do not have a 
stationary mean. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the nonstationarity 
of the mean arises from a deterministic trend or a stochastic trend. Rather 
than appeal to unit root tests to settle this issue, we take an agnostic 
position and examine both possibilities below. 
If our time series are trend stationary, the results of Table 4 provide 
an appropriate test for a common trend. To see this point let 
(15) In(qt) '" 0'1 + Yit + Y1t 
and 
(16) In (xt/nt) = 0'2 + Y2t + Y2t' 
where t denotes time, and Y1t and Y2t are stationary time series. Then, 
(17) Aln(qt) - Aln(xt/nt) = Y1 - Y2 + A(Y1t - Y2t
) 
To test Y1 
of Aln(qt) 
Y2 = 0, we can use the Normal approximation for the sample mean 
Aln(xt/nt), because the deviations from the mean, A(Y1t - Y2t)' 
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are stationary. So, for the trend stationary specification, the t ratios in 
Table 4 constitute evidence in favor of common trends. 
If our time series, In(qt) and In(xt/nt), are difference stationary and 
share a common seochastic erend, then they must be cointegrated. That is, 
there must exist a value of b for which In(qt) - bln(xt/nt) is seaeiopary. In 
fact, our model implies b = 1.17 In Table 6, we report the point estimates 
of b from the co integrating regression of In(qt) on In(xt/ntl and. ehe 
statistics for the residuals of these cointegrating regressions. . The T 
statistics are from regressions like (14) above with the intercept restricted 
to zero. These statistics reject ehe null of no cointegration for Finland, 
Germany and Spain using a test of size a .05, and for Austria, Belgium and 
Sweden using a test of size 0.10. 
cointegration. 
For the other countries, we don' t find 
The more specific hypothesis b z 1 cannot be tested using Table 6 because 
the standard error of b is not consistently estimated (and, therefore, not 
reported). We can, however, perform an alternative test by setting b = 1 and 
applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test in (14) with Yt set equal to In(qt) -
Table 7 reports the results: we reject the unit root null for 
Finland, Germany, Italy, and Spain using a test of size 0.05, and for Austria 
using a test of size 0.10. So, the hypothesis of a common stochastic trend is 
supported for these five countries. 
Given the low power of unit root tests, we think the results in Tables 6 
and 7 are really quite encouraging for the productivity hypothesis. In fact, 
the test results are favorable for the three countries (Finland, Germany and 
Spain) that have the longest data sets in our sample .18 This observation 
suggests that low PC?wer in small samples may be behind some of our unfavorable 
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results for other countries. In future work, we plan to investigate this issue 
by applying our unit root and cointegration tests to pooled samples from 
different countries. 
To summarize the main results here, we think the evidence presented in 
Tables 4, 6, and 7 suggests that long run trends in the productivity ratio are 
good predictors of long run trends in the real exchange rate. This complements 
recent work by Asea and Mendoza (1994) I who, using a different setup and sample 
from ours, also found a long run relationship between productivity shocks and 
the relative price of traded and nontraded goods. 
The labor absorption hypothesis and other observationS about the data: 
While the above results do offer support for our using the productivity 
hypothesis to explain inflation differentials, via equation (12). the average 
growth rates reported in Tables 1 and 2 do suggest caution. In eight of the 
eleven cases, productivity trends overpredict the real exchange rate 
appreciations (and therefore the inflation differentials with Germany); there 
are no substantial cases of underprediction. It is therefore interesting to 
speculate that something has been left out of the model. It is also 
interesting to ask why x/n has grown faster in some countries than in others. 
And finally, it is interesting to think about the labor absorption hypothesis: 
the possibility that the real exchange rate appreciations may have been caused 
by excessive growth of public sector employment and protection of the service 
sector. Here, we can only hope for an impressionistic view from the data; we 
make no attempt at formal testing. 
Figures 4A and B illustrate two representative groups of countries: 
Belgium, Italy, and Spain have experienced twice as much growth in x/n as 
Germany, Great Britain and France. Figures SA and B plot the growth in average 
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labor productivity in traded goods, while Figures 6A and B show the growth in 
average labor productivity in home goods. Both seem to have been a factor; 
that is, the group that experienced higher trend growth in x/n did so because 
traded good productivity grew faster and because home good productivity grew 
slower. 
The fast growth of productivity in traded goods may simply have reflected 
"catch up" or technology transfer after market liberalization, in which case 
it might not be expected to continue. Clearly, more work would be needed to 
draw any conclusions here. Our data may be able to shed more light on the slow 
growth of productivity in home goods. Figures 7A through J plot average labor 
productivity in traded goods, in total services, and in non-market services. 
Productivity growth in non- market services clearly lagged behind productivity 
growth in total services in most of the countries. This is evidence in support 
of the labor absorption hypothesis: growth in government employment appears to 
have draggea productivity aown in the service sector of most countries. It is 
interesting to note however that two of the three high x/n growth countries 
Belgium and Spain -- are exceptions to this; only in Italy is there much 
evidence that non- market services are the problem. 
Some economists have argued that demand factors are needed, in addition 
to producti vi ty trends, to explain these data. For one thing, it is often 
asserted that the service sector' s share in total production has risen, and 
this observation is at odds with the productivity hypothesis. The productivity 
hypothesis asserts that home goods have become more expensive to produce; so, 
supply factors suggest that the service sector's share should have fallen. 
Figures 8A and B confirm the conventional view: the service sector's share in 
production has risen in all of the countries, whether they experienced high x/n 
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growth or low. In fact, the data show a rather remarkable convergence in 
service sector shares everywhere except Germany, portugal and possibly Austria 
(not pictured) ;  Germany is again an outlier, on the low side . 
What are the demand factors that would explain the rise in service sector 
shares? Froot and Rogoff (1991) argued that a rise in government spending was 
an important determinant of real exchange rate appreciations. De Gregorio, 
Giovannini and Krueger (1993) found just the opposite. Figures 9A and B show 
that, with the notable exception of Spain, the share of government in total 
services has remained constant, or even fallen .19 De Gregorio, Giovannini and 
Krueger (1993) did argue that other demand factors were needed to explain the 
data, as did Stockman and Tesar (1995) (who were however using detrended datal. 
Our analysis is already general enough to have allowed for demand factors. As 
explained above, both supply and demand factors can be moving pn/pX in Figure 
2. So, the omission of demand factors need not be·a source of rejection for 
our version of the productivity hypothesis; this is an advantage of using 
average labor products instead of say total factor productivities (which are 
usually presumed to be exogenous) . 
We do however assume marginal cost pricing, while the labor absorption 
hypothesis suggests that the service sector has been protected. If rents were 
increasing in the service sector, then the increase in real exchange rates 
should be outrunning the increase in relative marginal costs, as proxied by 
x/no But Tables 1 and 2 show that in eight of the eleven cases productivity 
trends overpredict the real exchange rate appreciations, and that there are no 
substantial cases of underprediction. If we have a rejection of the model, it 
is in the wrong direction for the labor absorption hypothesis. 
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As we noted in Section I above, the labor absorption argument may be 
interpreted as the hypothesis that the observed trends in labor productivity 
are themselves caused by public sector growth and government protection of the 
home good sector. We cannot test this hypothesis with macroeconomic data, but 
it should be kept in mind for interpreting the policy implications of our 
findings. In terms of explaining the observed appreciations in excess of 
productivity trends, however, neither the labor absorption hypothesis nor the 
relative demand hypothesis seem useful. 
A potentially useful hypothesis may be based on the Lucas and Stockey 
(1987) distinction between cash goods and credit goods. So far, we have not 
had to say how money enters the analysis. Suppose now we envision a cash in 
advance framework where cash is required for the purchase of home goods; by 
contrast, traded goods can be bought on credit. If the model were modified to 
accamtodate this distinction between cash goods and credit goods, (4) would 
become: 
(181 pIl/P" • (y/61 (x/nl (1 + il 
The nominal interest rate, i, becomes a part of the relative cost of the home 
good, since cash has to be held in the place of bonds to purchase it. Leaving 
the interest rate out of this equation would make the other relative costs, 
proxied here by x/n, outrun the rise in the real exchange rate in a period when 
nominal interest rates were falling. 
This explanation works well in the middle and late 80' s, when both 
inflation and short term nominal interest rates were falling. The average fall 
in short term interest rates is of the same order of magni tude as the over 
prediction of real exchange rates. On the other hand, this story does not 
explain the first half of the sample, where x/n also seems to outrun q in some 
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cases. The insufficiency of data precludes our doing much more with this 
hypothesis. 
III. IHPLICATIORS OP OBSBRVKD PRODUCTIVITY TRBRDS POR IBFLATIOR 
The framework developed in the last section allows us to use observed 
trends in productivity to predict the differences in trend CPI inflation for 
countries that have fixed their nominal exchange rates or share a common 
currency. First, we calculate the predicted differentials in trend inflation 
for our eleven European countries. Then, we analyze the consistency of the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. And finally, we compare our results for 
Europe with the inflation differentials implied by productivity trends across 
regions within the United States. 
Inflation Differentials with GermanY in a Hard BEM. or in EMQ: 
Here, we use equation (12) to calculate the inflation differentials with 
Germany that are implied by trends in relative labor productivity. Table 2 
reports the average growth rate of xln for each country, and this is one way 
of estimating the trend in the time series for In(xln). Another way would be 
to calculate the slope of the best linear fit. But since these series may have 
unit roots, the averages growth rates reported in Table 2 are a more 
appropriate measure. The other parameter in (12) is �, the share of the home 
good in consumption. We measure � by the share of home goods in total value 
added in 1990. On one hand, this estimate is slightly too large for countries 
that are running a trade deficit. On the other hand, it is. slightly too small 
for projections into the future, since there is an upward trend in the 
production and consumption of home goods. 
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Table 8 reports the results. The countries can be divided into three 
groups: Belgium, Italy and Spain are in the first group; productivity trends 
imply that they should have inflation rates that are on average about 2t higher 
than German rates. Portugal, Denmark, Austria, France, Great Britain, and 
Sweden are in the second group; they should have inflation rates that are on 
average about It higher than German rates. Finland is in the last group; it 
should have inflation rates that are about the same as German rates. Again, 
these are the inflation differentials implied by assuming that the observed 
trends in productivity will continue under a system of fixed (nominal) exchange 
rates or a common currency. 
Table 9 averages the inflation differentials reported in Table 8 (using 
1991 GNP as weights) to find the difference implied by trends in productivity 
between union wide inflation rates and regional inflation in Germany for 
monetary unions of various sizes. If, for example, the union policy is to hold 
inflation constant in Germany, then these are the numbers one should add to the 
old German inflation target to get the new union wide target·. If the union is 
limited to Germany, Belgium and Austria, then the old German target hardly 
needs to be raised at all. It should be noted however that this is not because 
Belgium and Austria are natural partners for Germany in terms of their trends 
in productivity; in fact, Belgium is at the top of the list in Table 8. The 
inflation target need not be changed because Belgium and Austria are so s�ll. 
If France is added to the union, then the old German inflation target must be 
raised by about a half a percent; France is a big country, and that is what 
matters here. Adding Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Finland does not 
change the basic picture; the union wide inflation target still has to be about 
a half a percent higher than the old German target. But adding the southern 
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countries -- Italy, Spain and Portugal -- would make a significant difference: 
the union target would have to be about one percent higher than the old German 
target. 
Consistency of the Maastricht Convergence Criteria; 
Table 8 does suggest that if the observed trends in productivity continue 
to hold, strict convergence in inflation is inconsistent with a system of fixed 
exchange rates. However, it must be remembered that the Maastricht convergence 
criteria are more flexible than that for three reasons: (1)  to qualify for EMU, 
a country's inflation rate need only be within 1.5t of the three best 
performing member countries; (2) exchange rates can now float within 15% bands; 
and (3) tight monetary policy may be able to make inflation differentials less 
than what would be implied by trends in productivity, at least for short 
periods of time. 
In this sample, Austria might be viewed as setting the inflation standard 
for the "three best performing member countries". If so, it is the inflation 
differentials with Austria that count, and not the differentials with Germany 
that are reported in Table 8. However, inflation differentials with Austria 
can be readily seen in the numbers reported in Table 8 (by simply subtracting 
0. 8). The relevant inflation differentials for Italy and Spain are about 1%; 
Belgium is right on the 1.5% border that is allowed by the Treaty. 
There is however not much room for error. Italy and Spain have only . 5 %  
to spare, and not the 1.5% buffer that the convergence criteria would seem to 
allow. Belgium has no buffer at all. The large standard deviations reported 
in Tables 1 and 2 do indicate that inflation differentials can deviate rather 
substantially in the short run from the trends implied by productivity. The 
1St exchange rate bands allow some countries to run tighter monetary policies 
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than their lower inflation neighbors, and this may give them enough latitude. 
But, the productivity trends in Belgium, Italy and Spain are clearly working 
against them. 
Are European Inflation pifferentials Too Large for EMU? 
Finally, we ask if the variations in producti vi ty trends reported in Table 
2 and the implied inflation differentials reported in Table 8 are larger than 
those observed across regions in successful monetary unions. If so, one might 
wonder whether these countries belong in the same monetary union. 
Tables 10 and 11 are the counterparts to Tables 2 and 8 for eight regions 
in the United States; the regions correspond to aggregations used by Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1993) . 20 Table 10 reports the average growth rates of 
relative labor productivity, x/n, from 1977 to 1992. Comparing Table 10 with 
Table 2, we see that there is considerably less variation in productivity 
across regions in the Unites states. Table 11 reports the implied inflation 
differentials between various regions and the Mideast. Comparing Table 11 with 
Table 8, we see that the implied differentials in regional inflation are only 
about a fifth the size. The eight regions that make up the US are clearly more 
homogeneous than the countries that make up the EO. 
IV. stDIMARY.ARD CORCLUSIORS 
In section II, we defined the productivity hypothesis, and we tested it 
formally using data on ten European countries. OUr version of the hypothesis 
asserts that the trend in the ratio of home good and traded good prices should 
be equal to the trend in the ratio of their marginal costs, as measured by the 
ratio of their average labor products. OUr unit root and cointegration tests 
were quite supportive of this hypothesis, given the lack of power of these 
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tests and the small number of observations in our samples . We also argued that 
the cases where we observe appreciations in excess of what productivity trends 
imply cannot be explained by the relative demand hypothesis or the labor 
absorption hypothesis, which attribute the trend in real exchange rates to an 
increase in government spending and/or protection of the service sector . If 
there is a rej ection of the productivity hypothesis in these data, it does not 
appear to be in favor of either of the alternatives that we have considered. 
However, we have emphasized repeatedly that the relationship between real 
exchange rates and relative labor productivity (which defines our version of 
the productivity hypothesis) can also be interpreted along the lines of the 
absorption hypothesis; we can not differentiate between the productivity 
hypothesis and the labor absorption hypothesis using macroeconomic data . 
In section III, we calculated the cross country inflation differentials 
implied by observed trends in average labor productivity (when exchange rates 
are fixed or the countries share a conunon currency) . The results can be 
summarized as follows ; First, the countries fel,l into three categories. Trend 
inflation in Belgium, Italy and Spain should be about 2% higher than trend 
inflation in Germany; trend inflation in Portugal, Denmark, Austria, France, 
Great Britain, and Sweden should be about 1% higher than in Germany; and trend 
inflation in Finland should be about the same as in Germany . Second, if a 
monetary union were to come about, the difference between union wide inflation 
and regional inflation in Germany should depend on the size of the union . If 
the union were limited to Germany, Austria and Belgium, the difference should 
be negligible. Austria and Belgium are not natural union partners for Germany 
in terms of their productivity trends, but they are too small to matter . If 
France were added to the union, then union wide inflation should be . 5% higher 
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than German regional inflation. Adding Great Britain, Denmark and Finland 
would not change that fact, but adding Italy, Spain and Portugal should 
increase the difference to a full percentage point . Third, the differences �n 
inflation implied by observed productivity differentials across regions in the 
United States are much smal ler than the cross country inflation differentials 
implied by productivity trends in Europe ; regional inflation differences in the 
US are only about a fifth the size. 
What do we make of all this? First, we find no basic inconsistency in the 
convergence criteria that were written into the Maastricht Treaty. In the 
eleven countries we considered, the inflation rates implied by trends in 
productivity were within 1 . 5t of the Austrian rates . So, if Austria sets the 
standard for W the three best performing member countriesw , then the required 
convergence in inflation is not inconsistent with fixed exchange rate s .  None 
of these countries should be excluded from participating in EMU simply because 
their productivity trends are different from those in Germany. 
It should be recognized however that if current trends in productivity 
persist, the Maastricht convergence criteria put more burden of adjustment on 
those countries whose productivity trends are working against them. Should 
countries like Belgium, Italy and Spain be willing to bear this adjustment 
burden? Should they be forced to? 'I1le answers to these questions depend 
critically on the underlying causes of the slow growth of productivity in these 
countries' home good sectors . 
If we attribute the sluggish productivity growth to an exogenous 
teChnological process and assume that it will persist, then the costs of 
bearing the adjustment burden should be taken seriously. Countries like 
Belgium, Italy, and Spain have only about a half a percent of leeway , and our 
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results show that short run inflation differentials can vary substantially from 
those implied by trends in productivity . Monetary policy can of course be used 
to pull these short run differentials back in line, and the 1St exchange rate 
bands should be sufficient for this if stage two is not allowed to go on for 
too long . However, tight monetary policy can come at a price in terms of lost 
output and employment .  Belgium, Italy and Spain might be called upon to run 
unnaturally tight policies just to prove themselves worthy. Countries like 
Germany, Finland, Great Britain, Austria, and Denmark have productivity trends 
that allow them more room to manoeuver; they are clearly at an advantage . 
Trends in productivity should probably be considered when the Council of 
Ministers interprets the convergence criteria and decides which countries are 
eligible to participate in EMU. 
By contrast, if we attribute the sluggish productivity gains in the home 
good sector to excessive public sector growth and/or protection of the service 
sector, then the Maastricht criteria may provide a useful discipline for 
restoring a more efficient allocation of resources. MOre to the point , the 
convergence criteria may be needed to assure that the monetary union is free 
of inflationary pressures, since there may be reason to fear that countries 
exhibiting these problems would lobby for expansionary monetary policies, 
either to help absorb surplus labor or to accommodate the financing of fiscal 
deficits. Under this interpretation, strict observance of the convergence 
criteria would present countries like Belgium, Spain and Italy with a clear 
choice . They could implement reforms that would increase labor productivity 
in the home good sector, or they could take a chance that they would have to 
run unnaturally tight monetary policies just to qualify for EMU . 
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If a large monetary union does come about, should Germany be willing to 
accept a union wide inflation target that is about 1\ higher than its current 
target? According to our . model, this would hold trend inflation in Germany 
constant, but it might affect regional wage setting causing problems (at least) 
in the short run . Shou�d Germany argue for a union wide inflation target that 
matches its old target? This would imply a tighter inflation policy inside 
Germany than it had before union; trend inflation in Germany should drop by 1 \ .  
Should Germany argue for a policy that held its trend nominal interest rates 
constant? This policy would leave German shoe leather costs and seignorage tax 
distortions unchanged. These questions probably require more thought_  
Finally, do countries with widely differing productivity trends belong in 
the same monetary union? Have successful monetary unions had to cope with the 
questions discussed above? We saw that regional productivity trends are much 
more homogeneous in the United States than in Europe; the implied regional 
inflation differentials are a fifth the size of those in the EO. Will full 
economic integration cause productivity trends to converge in Europe? Is that 
what produced the homogeneity observed in the US? Once again, these are all 
questions for future research _  
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BHDHOTBS : 
1 .  Precise definitions of variables and data sources are give in the section 
that follows . 
2 .  The literature relating real exchange rates to trends in productivity 
dates back (at least) �o Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964 ) ,  who cast the 
discussion in terms of developing countries . Harston (1987) applied the 
theory to dollar-yen exchange rates ,  and most recently Stockman and Tesar 
(1995) have tried to explain real exchange rate movements using a real 
business cycle model . Papers that focus on Europe include De Gregorio, 
Giovannini and Krueger (1993 ) , De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1993 ) , 
Froot and Rogoff (199 1 ) , Micossi and Milesi- Ferretti (1994 ) ,  and Rebelo 
(1993) Froot and Rogoff (1994) provide a recent survey . 
3 .  See, in particular, Chinn (199 5 ) ,  De Gregorio, Giovannini and Krueger 
(1993 ) ,  De Gregori o ,  Giovannini and Wolf (1993 ) , Froot and Rogoff (1991) . 
4 .  De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1993) provide some evidence that this 
is indeed occurring in Europe . 
5 .  Alexander Lamfalussy (head of the European Monetary Institute, which is 
the precursor to a common central bank) has stated that "We must make 
absolutely sure, and without the slightest possible doubt , that the single 
European currency is as good and as stable as the D-mark " ; and Helmut Kohl 
(Chancellor of Germany, without which there will be no monetary union) has 
asserted that "We will not bring a European money into being that does not 
have the stability of the D - Mark" . These statements appeared in the 
Financial Times on April 2 7 ,  1995 . 
6 .  We don ' t  present regression equations except in a cointegration 
framework, where econometric exogeneity is not required. 
7 .  In contrast ,  the alternative formulation of the productivity hypothesis 
in terms of factor shares and total factor productivities is independent of 
demand factors only if we assume perfect capital mobility across sectors and 
countries and adopt a smal l - open - economy setup where the interest rate is 
exogenously determined (see, for example, Froot and Rogoff (1994) ] .  
8 .  Here, we are abstracting from risk premia to make the discussion simpler. 
Our empirical work i s  however based on equation ( 9 ) . It does not require 
this assumption. 
9 .  We have worked out (but not published) a complete two country model which 
serves as the basis for the discussion above . 
10 . Actually, data on Portugal are from 1977 to 1 9 9 0 .  
11 . D e  Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1993)  show that this classification 
makes sense . They calculate ratios of exports to total production and show 
that, with the exception of transport , only 2\ of services are traded; 
almost 30t of transportation services are traded however .  
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12. The data periods are as fol lows : Germany, 1960-1991: France , 1970-1992; 
Italy, 1970-1993; Great Britain, 1970-1990; Belgium, 1970-1990; Sw�den, 
1970- 1992; Finland, 1960- 1992; Austria, 1970· 1992; Spain, 1964-1992; 
Denmark , 1966 - 1992; Portuga l ,  1977- 1990. 
13. We had so few observations on portugal that we excluded it from the 
formal testing . 
14. For each regression equation. we start with the specification k_2 . If 
P2 is significantly different from zero (at the 10\ leve l ) , we pick this 
specification . If P2 is not significant, we move to k_ 1 .  Repeating this 
procedure , if �1 is not significant, we set k:O . 
15. The statistics for German data come close to their critical values for a 
test of size 0 . 1 0 .  
1 6 .  The power o f  the tests depends , not s o  much on the number of 
observations , but mainly on the historical length of the data series, say � 
in years . 
17. The presence of cointegration with b _ 1 still implies the equality of 
population means tested in Table 4; but the tests of Table 4 are not 
sufficient to establish the presence of cointegration . 
18 . The only other aBen country for which about 30 years of data are 
avai lable is the U . S .  Our results for the U . S .  (not reported) also support 
the productivity hypothes i s .  
19. Sweden seems t o  be an outlier i n  terms o f  levels , but there is no clear 
upward trend. 
2 0 .  Regional sectoral price deflators are not available, so we can not test 
the productivity hypothesis directly. However ,  we do have regional GDP 
inflation rates ; their differentials are of the order of magnitude predicted 
in Table 11 . 

Appendix: TRB DATA 
Data for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, 
and Sweden come from the DEeD National Accounts . Data for Austria, Portugal 
and Spain come from national statistics. (Francisco de Castro of the Bank of 
Spain collected and documented the data.) These sources proviqe annual 
sectoral data on nominal value added, real value added and number of employees. 
For ten of the countries, the data are complete for the years 1970 to 1990 ; for 
Portugal, the data begin in 1977. The traded sector is made up of the 
�manufacturing� sector and the � agriculture, hunting forestry and fishing" 
sector. The non-traded sector is made up of the " wholesale and retail trade , 
restaurants and hotels" sector, the " transport, storage and communication" 
sector, the " finance, insurance, real estate and business services� sector, the 
� community social and personal services ·  sector, and the " non-market services· 
sector; the " non-market services" sector is made up of the "producers of 
government services" subsector and the " other producers" subsector. 
Data consistency is always an issue. We are aware of the following 
anomalies in the OEeD data : (1) The German market services employment figures 
do not include the " real estate and business services" sector; value added 
figures do .  (2) The Italian, British and Belgian value added and employment 
figures do not include "real estate and business services "  sector. ( 3 )  British 
value added and employment figures consist of the ·producers of government 
services" sector; they do not include the · other producers" sector . 
Data for the United States come from the Regional Projections data of the 
Commerce Department ' s  Bureau of Economic Analysis. Regional inflation rates 
are derived from regional Gross State Product (GSP) deflators; deflators are 
not available for traded and nontraded goods at a sectoral level. This 
represents another slight inconsistency with the DEeD data which are measured 
according to value added rather than final product. 
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Table 1 GROWTH RATE OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
average 
std. dell . 
BEL ITA SPA POR DEN 
3.2 2.9 2.5 1 .3 1 .3 
2 . 8  2 . 2  2.6 2.9 3 . 1  
. data penod: 1 911-1 990 tor POR: 1 970·1990 for all others. 
Table 2: GROWTH RATE OF RELATIVE 'PRODUCTIVITY 
SEL ITA SPA POR DEN 
average 4.0 3 . 1  3.3 2.9 2 . 1  
std. de\". 2.6 2.6 2.' 3.6 4.8 
data period: 1 977·1 990 'or POR: 1 970·' 990 for all others. 
AUS 
2 . 1  
, . 5  
AUS 
2.0 
1 .9 
FRA 
1 . 5 
2.0 
FRA 
2.0 
1 .6 
GSR 
, . 5 
3 . 7  
GSR 
1 .8 
3.6 
SWE 
1 .0 
3.8 
SWE 
1 8 
2.5 
FIN 
1 . 1  
3 3  
FIN 
1 I 
3 . '  
OER 
.J 9 
I 7 
GER 
0 8  
2 • 
Table 3 :  CORRBLATIONS or THB GROWTH RATBS OP THB RBAL BXCHANGB RATS AND THS 
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO 
BBL 
0 . 3 4 
ITA 
0 . 1 1 
SPA DBN AUS PRA GSR SWE PIN GER 
0 . 0 5 0 . 6 4 - 0 . 04 - 0 . 1 8 0 . 3 9  0 . 0 1 0 . 12 0 . 4 7  
Tabl_ 4 :  SAMPLB MBANS AND THBIR t - RATIOS ( z - STATISTICS) POR 
61n C qt) - 61n (xt/nt) 
BBL ITA SPA DBN "cr" PRA GBR "n 
MEAN 0 . 8  0 . 2  - 0 . 1  0 . "  - 0 . 1  0 . '  0 . 3  0 . "  
(percent) 
z 1 .  07 0 . 3 2 - 0  . 1. 0 . 8 1 - 0 . 2 1  0 . 6 2  0 . 3 0 0 . 6 3 
STAT. 
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PIN GBR 
- 0 . 3  - 0 . 2  
- 0 . 3 4 - 0 . 5 2 
Table S ,  URXT-ROOT TBSTS ( T-STATISTICS) FOR lu(qt) ABD lu(""!,,,,) 
BBL ITA SPA DO ADS FRA GBR SlIB FIB GKR 
In (q) · 2 . 2 9  1 . 1 7  - 0 . 45 - 2 . 70* - 1 . 2 5  - 1 . 34 - 1 .  7 6  - 0 . 04 0 . 98 - 2 . 55 
I n ( x/n) - 1 . 26 - 0 . 10 - 1 . 14 - 2 . 4 0  0 . 31 - 0 . 82 - 1 . 48 - 0 . 29 0 . 74 - 2 . 40 
NOTE ; The r - statistic is the ratio of the point estimate of p to its standard 
error in equation (14) in the text. The rejection region for the unit root 
null (from Davidson and MacKinnon (199 3 ) , p .  7081 consists of values of T below 
- 2 . 8 6  ( - 2 . 57 )  for a test of size 0 . 05 ( 0 . 10 ) . * indicates rejection of the null 
for a test of size 0 . 1 0 .  
Table 6 ,  TBSTS FOR COINTBGRATIOB BBTWBBR In (qt) ABD lu(""!,,,,) 
BKL ITA SPA DO ADS FRA GBR SlIB PIB GRR 
b 0 . 79 0 . 88 0 . 90 0 . 54 0 . 9 6  0 . 77 0 . 70 0 . 5 8  0 . 9 6  1 . 05 
T - 3 . 08 * - 2 . 38 - 3 . 43 ** - 1 . 87 - 3 . 05* - 2 . 3 7  - 1 .  8 1  - 3 . 16 * - 5 . 73 ** - 3 . 72 ** 
NOTE : b is the slope coefficient in the cointegrating regression of In (qt ) on 
In (xt/nt ) .  T is the ratio of the point estimate of p to its standard error in; 
where vt is the residual from the cointegrating regression. We used the 
general-to- specific procedure described in footnote 12 to choose the lag length 
k .  The rejection region for the null of no cointegration (from Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993 ) , p. 722] consists of values of T below - 3 . 34 ( - 3 . 04 )  for a 
test of size 0 . 05 ( 0 . 10 ) . ** ( *) indicates rejection of the null for a test of 
size 0 . 05 ( 0 . 10 ) . 
BBL ITA SPA DO ADS FRA GBR PIB GKR 
NOTE : The T - statistic is the ratio of the point estimate of p to its standard 
error in equation (14) in the text, with Yt set equal to 
In ( qt) - I n ( xt/nt) .  The rejection region for the unit root null (from Davidson 
and MacKinnon (199 3 ) , p. 708] consists of values of T below - 2 . 8 6  ( - 2 . 57 )  for 
a test of size 0 . 05 ( 0 . 10 ) . ** ( *) indicates rejection of the null for a test 
of size 0 . 05 ( 0 . 10 ) . 
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Table 8: INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS WITH GERMANY UNDER FIXED RATES OR EMU 
Inflation Differential N·Good Share Growth in xln N*-Good Share 
BEL 2.3 0.72 3.98 0.64 
ITA 1 .1 0.71 3.12 0.64 
SPA 1 .. 0.64 3.29 0.64 
POR 1.3 0.62 2.90 0.84 
DEN 1 . 1  0.75 2.14 0.64 
AUS 0.8 0.67 2.03 0.64 
FRA 0.9 0.72 1 .97 0.64 
GBR 0.8 0.73 1 .79 0.64 
SWE 0.8 0.73 1 .82 0.64 
FIN 0.2 0.67 1 . 1 5  0.64 
production shares in 1990 
Table 9: EMU INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS WITH REGIONAL INFLATION IN GERMANY 
Inflation Differential 
EMU 1 :  GER. BEL, AUS 0.3 
EMU 2: GER, BEL, AUS. FAA 0.5 
EMU 3: GER, BEL, AUS. FRA, GBR, DEN, SWE, FIN 0.6 
EMU 4: GER, BEL, AUS, FRA, GBR, DEN, SWE. FIN. ITA, SPA, POR 0.9 
weights: GNP in 1991 US doliars, World Bank Atlas, 25th edition 
Table 10; GROWfH RATE OF RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY IN US REGIONS 
New Plains Southeast Southwest Rockies Fo. 
England West 
average 2.4 2.1 2.0 1 .1 2.2 2.1 
std. dev. 1.6 2.0 1.4 3.2 1 . 9  2.3 
data period: 1977·1 992. 
Table 1 1 :  US REG10NAl iNFLA TION DIFFERENTIALS (WITH MIDEAST REGION) 
Great 
lakes 
1 .7 
1 .9 
Mideast 
2.2 
2.0 
Inflation N·Good Share Growth in xln N*·Good Share 
Differential 
New England 0.0 0.52 2.40 0.55 
Plains -0.2 0.50 2.09 0.55 
Southeast -0.1 0.53 2.04 0.55 
Southwest -0.7 0.52 1.06 0.55 
Rockies ·0.1 0.54 2.15 0.55 
Far West ·0.1 0.55 2.13 0.55 
Great lakes ·0.4 0.49 1.69 0.55 
production shares in t990 
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Growth in x·/n· 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
Growth in x·/n* 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 
2.20 
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Figure 3D: Italian In(q) and In(xjn) 
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Figure 3H: Austrian In ( q) and In(x/n) 
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Figure 31: Swedish In(q) and In(x/n) " 
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Figure 3K: Portugese In(q) and In(x/n) 
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Figure 7C: British Labor Productivity 
value added per worker 
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Figure 7E: Spanish Labor Productivity 
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Figure 7G: Danish labor Productivity 
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Figure 7F: Belgian Labor Productivity 
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Figure 71: Swedish Labor Productivity 
value added per worker 
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